Double Consciousness After the Egyptian and Indian the Greek and Roman the In this essay I will discuss the ideologies behind Du Bois's concept of the veil . "Discipline and Punish" question the basic assumptions that underlie society.
Double Consciousness After the Egyptian and Indian the Greek and Roman the In this essay I Double Consciousness Essay Question will discuss the ideologies behind Du Bois's concept of the veil . "Discipline and Punish" question the Double Consciousness Essay Question basic assumptions that underlie society.
Kriegel and Van Gulick do not give fully developed accounts of justwhy the integration of first-order perceptions withhigher-order judgments should give rise to the properties that aredistinctive of phenomenal consciousness. But one plausiblereconstruction is as follows, modeled on the way that theconceptualization of analog (non-conceptual) first-order perceptualcontent can transform the latter's properties. Consider, for example,the familiar duck/rabbit. When someone sees this figure for the firsttime she may just experience a complex of curved lines, representingnothing. But when she comes to see it as a rabbit, thoselines take on a certain distinctive organization (the figure now hasboth a front and a back, for example), thereby transforming therepresented properties of the figure. Arguably what happens in suchcases is that the conceptual systems succeed in deploying arecognitional template for the concept rabbit, finding a‘best match’ with the incoming non-conceptualrepresentations. Indeed, there is reason to think that just such aprocess routinely takes place in perception, with conceptual systemsseeking matches against incoming data, and with the resulting statespossessing contents that integrate both conceptual and non-conceptual(analog) representations (Kosslyn 1994; Carruthers 2000). The resultis a single perceptual state that represents both aparticular analog shape and a rabbit. Now suppose that whensuch states are globally broadcast and are made available to thesystems responsible for higher-order thought, a similar process takesplace. Those systems bring to bear the concept experience orthe concept seeing to produce a further integrated perceptualstate. This single state will not only have first-order contentsrepresenting the lines on the page, and representing a rabbit, theywill also have a higher-order content representing that one isexperiencing something rabbit-like. Hence the perceptualstate in question becomes ‘self-presenting’, and acquires,as part of its content, a dimension of seeming orsubjectivity.
Some varieties of part-whole self-representational theory take thesame general form as actualist kinds of HOT theory, in which afirst-order perceptual state with the content analog-red (asit might be) gives rise to a higher-order belief that one isexperiencing red. But rather than claiming that it is the first-orderperception that becomes phenomenally conscious because of the presenceof the higher-order belief, what is said that the complex state madeup of both the first-order perception and thehigher-order belief becomes conscious. (Gennaro 1996, defends a viewof this sort.) As Kriegel (2006) points out, however, it is unclearhow this theory could offer any substantive benefits not alreadyobtainable from actualist HOT theory. Moreover, on the downside, theaccount has to let go of the intuition that a conscious mental stateis one of which the subject is aware. Rather, what will be said isthat a conscious state is one that contains two parts, one of which isan awareness of the other.
Two of the most significant and distinguished concepts fostered by both of these theorists are the concepts of “double consciousness” and “the stranger”.
Consciousness rather than merely mean the state of not being asleep it is the basic ability of an organism to perceive and consequently respond to selected features of their environment.
In a recent review, Lau and Rosenthal (2011) survey the empiricalevidence pertaining to the difference between higher-order theoriesand first-order ones. While much is equivocal, and many questions areleft unanswered, they point to a pair of studies that support ahigher-order account. One is Lau and Passingham (2006), who are ableto demonstrate using carefully controlled stimuli that there arecircumstances in which people's subjective reports of visualexperience are impaired while their first-order discriminationabilities remain fully intact. They also find that visualconsciousness in these conditions is specifically associated withactivity in a region of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Then in afollow-up study Rounis et al. (2010) find that transcranial magneticstimulation directed at this region of cortex, thereby disrupting itsactivity, also has a significant impact on people's meta-visualawareness, but again without impairing first-order taskperformance.
However, as we might notice throughout the semester, there are two senses of consciousness that causes controversy when applied to animals: phenomenal consciousness, and self-consciousness....
What options does a first-order theorist have to resist thisconclusion? One is to deny that the data are as problematic as theyappear (as does Dretske 1995). It can be said that the unconsciousstates in question lack the kind of fineness of grain and richness ofcontent necessary to count as genuinely perceptual states. Onthis view, the contrast discussed above isn't really a differencebetween conscious and unconscious perceptions, but rather betweenconscious perceptions, on the one hand, and unconscious belief-likestates, on the other. Another option is to accept the distinctionbetween conscious and unconscious perceptions, and then to explainthat distinction in first-order terms. It might be said, for example,that conscious perceptions are those that are available tobelief and thought, whereas unconscious ones arethose that are available to guide movement (Kirk 1994). Afinal option is to bite the bullet, and insist that blindsight andsensorimotor perceptual states are indeed phenomenally conscious whilenot being access-conscious. (See Block 1995; Tye 1995; andNelkin 1996; all of whom defend versions of this view.) On thisaccount, blindsight percepts are phenomenally conscious states towhich the subjects of those states are blind. Higher-order theoristswill argue, of course, that none of these alternatives is acceptable(see, e.g., Carruthers 2000).
Understanding that there are different spectrums of consciousness and that each type represents different principles is the best approach to understanding awareness....
Higher-order theorists will allow, of course, that mental states canbe targets of higher-order representation without being phenomenallyconscious. For example, a belief can give rise to a higher-orderbelief without thereby being phenomenally conscious. What isdistinctive of phenomenal consciousness is that the states in questionshould be perceptual or quasi-perceptual ones (e.g. visual images aswell as visual percepts). Moreover, most cognitive/representationaltheorists will maintain that these states must possess a certain kindof analog (fine-grained) or non-conceptual intentional content. Whatmakes perceptual states, mental images, bodily sensations, andemotional feelings phenomenally conscious, on this approach, is thatthey are conscious states with analog or non-conceptual contents. Soputting these points together, we get the view that phenomenallyconscious states are those states that possess fine-grainedintentional contents of which the subject is aware, being thetarget or potential target of some sort of higher-orderrepresentation.